ISO 27001 CertifiedSOC 2 Compliant A product by Visit the Trust Center
Agent 05 · The Exploit Agent

An AI security engineer for your lean team.

Connect a repo and the Exploit Agent reasons like an attacker: it indexes the code, builds a threat model, sets 23 specialist workers hunting, then proves each finding with a working exploit. Not a scanner spraying alerts; a teammate who ships confirmed, fixable bugs.

The agent, thinking

Watch it hunt, the way a pentester would.

From a fresh clone to a confirmed remote-code-execution bug and an open pull request. This is the Exploit Agent reasoning through one run, condensed.

Exploit agent · reasoning live
23
Specialist workers hunt in parallel, each an OWASP-class expert
0
“maybe” findings, every result is validated and proven
1
Engineer’s workload, done by an agent that never gets tired
The squeeze

Your whole app. One security engineer. Maybe.

Lean teams ship faster than they can review. Pentests are a once-a-year snapshot; scanners drown you in maybes that someone still has to read. The gap between “code shipped” and “code checked” is where breaches live.

01

Too much surface

Every route, dependency and workflow is attackable, and it grows with each merge.

02

Too few people

Most teams have no dedicated AppSec engineer, let alone one per repository.

03

Too much noise

Traditional scanners pattern-match and cry wolf. The real bug hides in the false-positive pile.

Set up

Connect a repo. Point it at what matters.

Connect GitHub, pick a repository and branch, then choose how deep to go. Run a full scan, or just open a session and ask, in plain language, for exactly the classes you care about. The agent works on precisely that.

Interactive session plain language
VenusHawk

Repo config

Branch, investigation depth, full-scan or interactive, review scope before the run, and model selection.

Interactive session

Ask for specific vulnerability classes in plain language; the agent works on exactly that.

Smart scope

Auto-deselects example, test and non-shipped code, focusing on what actually ships. Narrow to folders when you want.

Live exploitation (beta)

Point it at a sandboxed deployment to safely validate impact end-to-end.

Step one

It reads your code before it hunts.

The agent indexes the shipped application code and builds a threat model, assets, trust boundaries, entry points and the classes most likely to bite. Every worker that follows hunts this map, not a generic checklist.

Threat model · auto-generated214 records in scope
Stack
Node.js · Express · React · PostgreSQL
Entry points
38 routes, 12 accept untrusted input
Trust boundaries
Public API, authenticated API, admin console, background worker
Assets at risk
Customer records, credentials, cloud metadata, CI secrets
Focus classes
Command injection, SSRF, IDOR, RCE, XSS
Step two

A planned team of specialists, not a scanner.

A planner agent decides who works. Twenty-three specialist workers, each an expert in one bug class, hunt in parallel and emit candidates. Breadth no single reviewer could hold in their head, running at once.

Specialist workers · 234 hunting in parallel
SQL injectionNoSQL injectionCommand injectionSSTIXXEPath traversalStored XSSReflected XSSDOM XSSCSRFOpen redirectSSRFIDORAuth bypassPrivilege escalationInsecure deserializationRace conditionMass assignmentLDAP injectionHeader injectionUnrestricted uploadJWT flawsBusiness logic
A planner agent decides which specialists run against this codebase, and each one emits candidates, never verdicts. Nothing is a finding until the validator agrees.
Step three

A validator kills the noise.

Every candidate is re-read in batches of ten. The validator checks for framework defences, ORM prepared statements, template auto-escaping, auth middleware, and confirms or rejects each one with a written reason. This is why the results are worth reading.

Validator · candidates re-read in batches of tenframework-defence aware
CONFIRM
Heredoc delimiter injection → RCEUser input reaches a shell heredoc; no framework defence on the path. Exploitable.
REJECT
Reflected XSS candidateReact auto-escapes this render path. Not exploitable, rejected with a written reason.
CONFIRM
IDOR on /api/records/:idNo tenant check before the read; cross-tenant access confirmed.
REJECT
SQL injection candidateParameterised through the ORM’s prepared statement. Safe, not a finding.
Over-rejection recovery re-surfaces borderline candidates as pending review, a real bug is never silently dropped.
Every finding, proven

Not “maybe”, here’s the exploit.

A confirmed finding lands with everything an engineer needs to fix it and a reviewer needs to trust it: the vulnerable line, a working exploit, the impact, and a code-level fix ready to open as a PR.

CRITICALHeredoc delimiter injection → Remote Code Execution
parse-yaml.ts:46 · Command Injection · confidence: High
44// delimiter comes straight from the uploaded manifest
45const tag = manifest.name;
46exec(`cat <<${tag}\n${body}\n${tag}`);  // tag is attacker-controlled
CVSS 9.3Full exploit, a curl proof-of-concept and a code-level fix are attached, editable CVSS, and a false-positive mark teaches the org knowledge base.Generate fix PR
Exploit, spelled out
Location, category, confidence, a code-level explanation and exactly how an attacker exploits it, with a concrete curl command, HTTP request or exploit URL.
Code-level remediation
Impact plus a specific fix, ready to open as a pull request.
CVSS you control
Adjust the score if the agent over- or under-claimed; your correction becomes org-wide knowledge.
False-positives that learn
Mark a finding false with a reason and the org knowledge base fact-checks similar findings next time instead of repeating.
Beyond the code

The whole software-supply picture.

The same investigation covers everything around the code, then hands off to live pentesting when you want it proven against something running.

Dependencies & CVEs

A CVE-verification agent runs reachability analysis, is the vulnerable path actually reachable?, and flags supply-chain risk with a written verdict.

Secrets

Secret detection across the codebase, including older commits in history.

IaC, headers, SBOM & EOL

Infrastructure-as-code and header issues, SBOM export, and end-of-life component detection.

Code quality

Lint, complexity, dead code and documentation gaps.

Wiki & codebase context

Auto-generated architecture wiki, dataflow diagrams, entry points, dangerous sinks and auth/authz flows, per module and per repo.

GitHub Actions

Scans your CI/CD workflows for insecure configuration.

Prove it live

From plausible to proven, in a sandbox.

Turn on live exploitation and the agent runs its findings against a sandboxed deployment, safely firing the actual exploit and keeping a full verification log. A finding stops being an argument and becomes a fact.

Live exploitation · sandboxIsolated target · verification log
EX-2231IDORGET /api/patients/1042 returns another tenant’s record.Probed in isolation; cross-tenant read confirmed · CVSS 8.1. Exploitable
EX-2228SSRFImport-by-URL reaches the cloud metadata endpoint.Reached 169.254.169.254 in the sandbox; credential path mapped. Exploitable
EX-2225RCEThe YAML parser executes a shell heredoc from user input.Command executed safely in the sandbox; blast radius captured. Exploitable
Why it’s different

It thinks like the attacker, not the linter.

Scanners match patterns and hope. The Exploit Agent reasons from a threat model to a working exploit, and learns from your team as it goes.

Hacker’s mindset
Starts from a threat model and attacker goals, not a rule list, so it finds logic and chained bugs scanners miss.
Proof, not probability
Every finding is validated, and optionally exploited live. No triage pile.
Defence-aware
Understands the frameworks in your stack, so it stops crying wolf at safe code.
Learns your org
CVSS corrections and false-positive marks become shared knowledge across every future scan.
End to end
Code, dependencies, secrets, IaC and CI/CD, one investigation, one report.
Part of the constellation
Hands findings to the Attack Surface and Network agents to show real blast radius.
Pricing

Priced by outcomes. Never by seats.

VenusHawk isn’t sold by the developer. There are no seats to buy, no minimum order, and no cap on how many engineers touch the code. You equip one agent with your repositories and pay only for the work it does, in VenusHawk Credits, as you go.

The seat model

Priced by headcount

  • Pay per developer seat, used or not
  • Minimum seats and annual lock-in
  • Every engineer you add inflates the bill
  • Idle licences, wasted budget
VenusHawk Credits

Priced by work done

  • One agent, equipped with all your repositories
  • Pay as you go, credits, never seats
  • No minimums, no cap on developer seats
  • Your bill tracks how hard you put the agent to work
Developer seats, there are none to buy, ever
0
Minimum order, start any size, scale at your pace
1
Agent, equipped with every repo you point it at

The more of your ecosystem you hand it, the more it finds, and you only ever pay for that work. Outcome‑oriented, not licence‑oriented.

Early access

Bring this agent into your constellation.

VenusHawk is rolling out to lighthouse customers and design partners. Tell us a little about your environment and we’ll see how we can accommodate you.